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Who benefits from commodity price increases?  During the summer of 2008, corn futures prices 
rose 119.8% compared to the previous year.  The resulting nominal prices were the highest in 
history.  Agricultural land values quickly followed suit with Illinois experiencing a 19.3% 
increase in cropland values between 2007 and 2008, the largest year-over-year increase ever in 
the Corn Belt (USDA, 2008a).  After the dramatic price shock in 2008, anecdotal evidence 
implied that much of these benefits accrued to land owners through increased land values and 
cash rent levels. In this article, we use unique farm-level data for the state of Illinois to determine 
how farmland rents are affected by changes in commodity prices and government payment 
levels, while controlling for farm and regional characteristics. 
A number of studies have investigated  the relationship between land prices and residual 
returns (Awokuse and Duke, 2006; Phipps, 1984), government payments, conservation and land 
retirement programs (Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magné, 2003; Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné, 
1992; Nickerson and Lynch, 2001; Shaik, 2007; Shaik, Helmers and Atwood, 2006; Taylor and 
Brester, 2005), global warming (Mendelsohn and Dinar, 2003), and urbanization pressures 
(Livanis et. al, 2006; Plantinga, Lubowski and Stavins, 2002). However, we see little consensus 
on the degree to which land prices capture changes in profit.   
  One method for observing capitalization is by considering land rents, where one might 
expect to see a more rapid response to changes in agricultural revenue.  As Ricardian theory 
would predict, a couple initial studies on cash rents show that soil productivity and yield 
potential have positive effects, such as Forster et al. (2003) in Ohio and Kurkalova, Burkart, and 
Secchi (2004) in the Upper Mississippi River Basin. A recent focus in the cash rent literature is 
the estimation of the incidence of government payments (e.g, Kirwan, 2009; Goodwin, Mishra, 
and Ortalo-Magné, 2005; Lence and Mishra, 2003). Data used in these studies have ranged from 
national farm-level data to regional data at the county-level and the estimates of incidence rates 
have varied considerably.  More recently, Du et al. (2007) analyze how cash rents in Iowa have 
responded to factors including growth in the ethanol industry, scale of the local livestock 
industry, and adoption of genetically engineered crops. 2 
 
  The purpose of this study is to revisit the question of how farm land markets change in 
response to changes in commodity prices. Using unique farm-level, longitudinal data from the 
Illinois Farm Bureau Farm Management (FBFM) Association, we estimate a spatial hedonic 
model of the determinants of Illinois’ cash rents and derive the marginal contributions of changes 
in commodity prices and government payment levels, while controlling for inherent parcel and 
regional characteristics.  This study makes several important contributions and extensions to this 
literature.   
First, our panel data set includes farm-level observations for cash rents and other 
characteristics that were unavailable to researchers in previous studies.  Our results indicate a 
significant difference between the farm-level results and those obtained from the same data 
aggregated to the county level.  Second, existing studies have tended to focus on eras of 
relatively stable commodity prices from the late 90’s through the mid 00’s. We include data from 
1996 through 2008, a period which encompasses the sharp increase in commodity prices that 
began in 2005, as well as two significant changes in farm policy – the 1996 and 2002 farm bills.   
Finally, this analysis extends the literature on the valuation of heterogeneous agricultural 
land.  By explicitly accounting for variations in soil quality, urbanization pressures, economies of 
scale, and economic characteristics, a clearer view of how commodity price changes ultimately 
flow through to rental markets is observed.  Also, the degree of regional correlation among rental 
rates is typically quite high, which causes efficiency problems in classical econometric 
estimation. Thus, we allow for heterogeneity across tenant farmers while explicitly controlling 
for the spatial nature inherent in the data by using a leading-edge spatial panel error component 
estimation method (Kapoor et al. 2007) which simultaneously accounts for the spatial and 
temporal correlations.  The application of this estimator is unique to this literature.  
Similar to previous work, we find that marginal output price changes and government 
payment levels have a significant effect on cash rents. In contrast to predictions of Ricardian rent 
theory, we find that the majority of increased revenues are accumulated by the tenant farmer in 
lieu of the landowner.  We also observe that the move to more predictable government payments 
resulted in substantial increases in the amount of the subsidy capitalized into land costs.  The 
results also provide substantiating evidence that both cross-county and intra-county soil 
productivity variations have considerable impacts on cash rent levels, as well as the existence of 3 
 
strong spatial effects.  Parcels within relatively rural areas as well as those operated by farmers 
with large scale operations are also likely to pay slightly higher rents. Last, we find limited 
evidence of a risk premium in Illinois.  
Background 
The use of hedonic modeling approaches has been common in the literature on the determinants 
of farmland values (e.g. Palmquist and Danielson, 1989; Xu, Mittelhammer, and Barkley, 1993; 
Oltmans, Chicoine, and Scott, 1988; Craig, Palmquist, and Weiss, 1998). Huang et al. (2006) 
were the first to incorporate both spatial and temporal correlations into their estimation 
procedures within a hedonic framework.  They estimate the determinants of farmland values in 
Illinois from 1979 to 1999 using a spatial lag model after first transforming their data to correct 
for temporal correlations assuming an AR(1) process.  
Hedonic approaches within the cash rent literature have been less common. For example, 
Du et al. (2007) use the variable profit function approach in their study of cash rents in Iowa.  
Using annual, county-level survey data and employing a spatial error autoregressive model, they 
find that a 1$ increase in relative prices increases cash rents by approximately $79 in the short 
run. While, like us, they control for spatial correlation, they use county-level data to ask how 
cash rents are affected by the local ethanol and livestock industries, and the level of adoption of 
genetically modified crops within the county. 
A growing number of cash rent studies have focused on the impact of government 
payments. Lence and Mishra (2003) use county-level data from Iowa to estimate the effect of a 
variety of government payment types on cash rent levels. Their results imply that marketing loan 
assistance and production flexibility contract payments increase cash rent levels by $0.70 to 
$0.90 per dollar of program payment.  Goodwin, Mishra, and Magné (2005) find similar 
incidence rates for decoupled farm programs in the United States based on farm-level data from 
the USDA’s annual Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) covering the period 
1998 to 2001. Patton et al. (2008) also estimate high incidence rates outside of the United States 
using data on government payments for beef and sheep in Northern Ireland.  
Using farm-level data from the 1992 and 1997 Census of Agriculture, Roberts, Kirwan, 
and Hopkins (2003) find much lower incidence rates, roughly half the size of those found by 4 
 
Lence and Mishra (2003). A recent study by Kirwan (2009) reports even lower incidence rates – 
approximately 25% - in the United States using data from the 1992 and 2007 Census of 
Agriculture and the 2005 ARMS survey. While the methods employed by the authors and the 
data sets upon which their results are based differ, the wide range of incidence estimates suggest 
further work in this area is needed.   
Our study is differentiated from these in a number of ways.  We use a data set which 
covers a more recent time period (1996-2008) and provides a true panel of farms in Illinois. Our 
data also includes both farm and parcel characteristics which are not available from the data 
sources used by other authors (e.g., soil productivity).  
Additionally, we have combined a hybrid of the methods previously applied in the land 
value and cash rent literatures.  Rather than relying on realized sales or returns, the use of which 
has been noted to introduce estimation error (Roberts et al., 2003), we include futures prices to 
account for (expected) changes in profitability over time. We also include trend yields, a measure 
of soil productivity, and a measure of yield variability to account for farm-level heterogeneity in 
terms of both profitability and risk. Our estimation method, while similar to those used by Huang 
et al. (2006) and Du et al. (2007) in that they account for correlation across both spatial and 
temporal dimensions, is unique in that it simultaneously accounts for the spatial and temporal 
factors within the estimation process.  
Methods 
Within the context of cropland cash rents, the hedonic framework suggests that the equilibrium 
rent per acre is a function which maps individual attributes of the land into a single price.  The 
relationship can be represented by the hedonic equation: 
(1)  ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 
where ￿ is the rental price of the parcel per acre, and ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ is a vector of ￿ unique 
characteristics of the land (Palmquist, 1989). 
The hedonic approach has been extensively employed in the study of agricultural land 
values (Bastian et al 2002, Chicoine 1981, Shi et al 1997, Palmquist 1989, Palmquist and 
Danielson 1989, Huang et al. 2006). Parcel characteristics such as soil type, fertility levels, and 5 
 
location reflect the production potential of the land.  Commodity prices assign a value to this 
production potential. Collectively, these factors contribute to its equilibrium rental price.   
Characteristics of the tenant farmer represent a source of heterogeneity for cash rent 
levels.  Observing measures of the tenant farmer's ability and risk preferences are typically not 
available to the econometrician and must be absorbed into the error component of the model, 
suggesting a random effects panel framework.  Other unobserved characteristics such as varying 
degrees of information within land rental markets are also captured in the error term, and are 
likely spatially correlated. Assuming linearity, these factors imply that the hedonic model can be 
written as: 
(2)  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿,     
where ￿ is a matrix of parcel characteristics such as soil quality, ￿ is a matrix of regional 
characteristics such as yield variation, and ￿ is a matrix of economic characteristics such as price 
and government payments, where these independent variables together are simplified as the 
matrix X: [Z,V,P]=X. The vectors of model parameters to be estimated are given by  ￿￿￿￿￿ and 
 .  Finally, ! represents the model error whose structure includes both temporal and spatial 
correlation. 
The specification in (2) is assumed to follow a typical spatial error process where " is the 
cross-sectional index and # is the index for the time dimension (Baltagi, 2008).  Focusing on the 
spatial effects, the observations can be thought of as stacked cross sections with !$ denoting an N 
x 1 vector of disturbance terms characterized by a first order spatial autoregressive process: 
(3)  ￿￿ ￿ %&￿￿ ￿ '￿, 
where ( is the scalar spatial autoregressive parameter, ) is the N x N time invariant spatial 
weights matrix and '$ is an N x 1 vector of innovations (Anselin, 2002).   
 
Similar to a shift operator used in time series analysis (e.g. # * +), spatial econometrics 
constructs the so-called "spatial lag operator", a new variable consisting of the weighted averages 
of neighboring observations as specified through the weights matrix.  Stacking the observations 
in the panel, the vector of spatially lagged error terms for the above equation is as follows: 6 
 
(4)  &￿ ￿ ￿,-.&/￿￿ , 
with 01 an identity matrix with dimension 2.  The disturbance process can be rewritten in stacked 
notation as: 
(5)  ￿/ ￿ %￿,-.&￿￿/ ￿ '/, 
or, 
(6)  ￿/ ￿ ￿,-.345￿'/, 
where 6 ￿ ￿0 * ()￿ and is commonly recognized as the spatial filter.  We assume the 
remainder error component 7 may be temporally autocorrelated, but is not spatially correlated 
across units.  The remainder error 7 is specified as a one way error component model to allow for 
the innovations to be correlated over time: 
(7)  '/ ￿ ￿8-.,/￿9/ ￿ :/, 
with ;< the N x 1 vector of cross-sectional random components (i.e. the unobservable and time-
invariant individual specific effect) and =< the remainder disturbance varying over both the 
cross-sectional and temporal dimensions and >< is a vector of ones. 
Following Kapoor et. al (2007), we assume the remaining error components, ;?$@A￿B@=?$, 
are i.i.d. with mean zero, variance CD
E and  CF
E, respectively, and have finite fourth moments.  In 
estimating the spatial autoregressive parameter and variance components, a generalized method 
of moments estimator is used as suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1999).  The GMM estimators 
use all moment conditions and an optimal weighting scheme based on the inverse of the variance 
covariance matrix of the sample moments at the true parameter values under the assumption of 
normally distributed residual errors, 7.  Kapoor et al. (2007) note that, while this matrix may not 
be strictly optimal in the absence of normality, it can be viewed as a reasonable approximation of 
the true variance covariance matrix.   
The estimates of the spatial coefficient and variance components are then used to define a 
feasible generalized least squares estimator (FGLS) by further transforming the already spatially 
transformed model by pre-multiplying it by 0<1 * GHI, where 0<1 is an identity matrix, G ￿ + *
CF CD J  and K￿ ￿ L1LM1 2 N .0<, the standard transformation matrix well known in the error 7 
 
component literature.  The result is a doubly transformed model with estimators identical to that 
of OLS (Baylis, Garduño-Rivera, and Piras 2009). Thus, the coefficient estimator is given by: 















where the parameter ( S is an estimate of the spatial correlation.  The matrices X
* and R
* are 
spatially-filtered independent and dependent variables respectively, thus Q<
R￿( S￿ ￿ \01.￿0< *
( S)<￿Q<] and ￿<
R ￿( S￿ ￿ \01.￿0< * ( S)<￿￿<].  The variance-covariance matrix of residual 
errors, 7,  UV￿<
4￿is based on estimates of the variance of the spatial and temporal errors,@C SF￿<
E ￿C SD￿<
E  .  
For details, please see Kapoor et al (2007).  
Data 
This study employs farm-level data from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management 
Association (FBFM), county-level yield data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service, 
and corn futures settlement prices from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).  The FBFM data 
span the years 1996 through 2008, and contains financial, management, and agronomic variables 
for more than 6,000 cooperating farmer members. 
The full FBFM data set was cleaned of a number of reporting errors and outliers.
1 Cash 
rents and soil productivity ratings (SPR) reported as negative or zero were excluded. Farms 
which reported positive cash rent levels, but had zero cash rented acres or zero operator acres 
were also removed.  One constraint of our estimation methodology is that a balanced panel is 
required, thus we consider only farms for which observations are available for the entire 13 year 
period of our data. The resulting balanced panel of farm level data includes 408 individual 
farmers. The county-level data consists of 78 of Illinois’102 counties per cross-section. Table 1 
reports selected summary statistics for the county- and farm-level datasets used in the spatial 
error component analysis. 
The dependent variable for each analysis is cash rent per acre. Expected corn prices and 
government payments received are included as measures of the land’s potential to generate 
returns to the farmer. The parcel characteristics considered are expected corn yields, intra-county 
soil productivity differences, crop yield risk, and measures of urbanization pressure and farm 8 
 
size.  All financial measures are adjusted to 2008 dollars using a farmer specific producer price 
index based on non-land costs.
2   
In defining our measure of expected corn prices, we assume farmers typically enter into 
rental agreements in the winter prior to the following crop year. The PRICE variable is defined 
as the average settlement for corn futures in November for harvest futures contract (December) 
for the following crop year. Government payments received by the farm are available in the 
FBFM database.  These include all Farm Service Agency payments.  For the Illinois farms in our 
dataset, program payments would come primarily from decoupled direct payments, the price-
based counter-cyclical program, production flexibility contracts, marketing loans, conservation 
programs, and disaster assistance.
3 
Parcel characteristics measuring both yield potential and yield risk are also included. 
Expected trend yields for each farm serve as a measure of inter-county productivity across 
Illinois farms. The ExpYield variable is defined as the detrended county yield level based on a 
simple linear trend fit to NASS county yield data from 1972 through 2008. Intra-county 
differences in yield potential are captured using the soil productivity rating (SPR) information 
reported at the farm-level in the FBFM database. The variable FtoCSPR is defined as the ratio of 
the farm-level SPR rating to average SPR for farms in the same county. Yield risk is measured 
by the coefficient of variation(CV) of county-level yields based on a 15-year rolling average. The 
yield risk measure is updated every year within the panel to account for potential changes in 
yield risk over time.
4  Following Huang et al. (2006), the effect of urbanization pressures on cash 
rent levels is controlled using the USDA-ERS Beale Rural-Urban Continuum Code.  Finally, a 
measure of farm size is included and defines as total acres (Acres) of the operation as reported in 
the FBFM database.   
To capture spatial correlation, we use a block weights matrix based on the county for the 
individual farm-level data, and a queen-contiguity weights matrix for the county-level data 
analyses.  Because we do not observe individual locations of farms within a county, we are 
constrained to only using a coarse measure of spatial correlation.  However, given county-level 
tax policies and local information flow, we feel using a county-level block weight to identify 
neighbors does capture a key component of the spatial relationship.   9 
 
Some data limitations should be noted.  Although a portion of cash leases are 
renegotiated each year, the length of individual contracts is unknown.  The actual timing of the 
lease signing is also unknown.  We assume rents are renegotiated annually prior to the beginning 
of crop year, which is consistent with previous work in this area. Furthermore, we provide results 
from alternative specifications to investigate any bias that this assumption might introduce.   
In addition, it is likely that some reported rental rates are ones in which the landowner 
rents directly to a family member, increasing the likelihood that the reported cash rent level does 
not reflect the true market value of the land’s hedonic characteristics.  Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that share rental or hybrid agreements might be more highly favored in family 
situations (Forster, 2003).  Since our data excludes non-cash agreements, and we have made 
efforts to remove outliers, we are confident that this is not a major issue in the context of our 
analysis.  
The representative nature of the farms included in the FBFM database might also cause 
concern.  FBFM cooperators do not comprise a randomly-selected sample, nor are the farm 
observations weighted as is the case in the USDA ARMS database. To further investigate 
whether selection bias may be an issue in our data, we compared FBFM summary statistics for 
cash rent levels across the time period within our panel to average cash rents for the state of 
Illinois as reported by NASS. Figure 1 illustrates these averages on an annual basis from 1996 
through 2008.  The NASS and FBFM cash rent averages are very similar in magnitude and tend 
to trend together throughout the years of observation.  This evidence suggests that the FBFM 
data is in fact representative of cash rents paid by farmers throughout the state of Illinois. 
Results 
Table 2 reports the estimation results from the balanced panels at the county- and farm-levels. 
The estimation results from a standard random effects panel estimator are also provided for 
comparison to those generated from the spatial error component estimator described in the 
Methods section.  All reported specifications regress cash rent per acre against the attributes 
discussed in the Data section. The last two columns of table 2 report estimation results from the 
spatial error component estimator for two different time periods defined by the changes to 
government programs included in the 2002 Farm Bill.   10 
 
The signs and significance of the coefficient estimates are all as expected, with the 
exception of CV and Beale. With the exception of the random effects estimates at the county 
level, the measure of urbanization was found to have a statistically insignificant effect on cash 
rents.  The estimated effect of yield risk was not robust across estimators and the level of data 
aggregation.    
The findings suggest there are significant spatial error correlations present at both levels 
of aggregation with@( ￿ ^￿_` for the county-level data, and 0.278 for the complete farm-level 
dataset.  Because our methods assume that the spatial nature remains unchanged over the time 
period, we estimated yearly Moran’s I statistics, which calculate the correlation between cash 
rents and spatially-weighted cash rents.  These statistics were very consistent over our 13-year 
time-period, ranging from 0.19 to 0.30 at the farm level, and 0.70 to 0.85 at the county.  All 
yearly statistics showed spatial correlation at the 0.01 level of significance. 
We find strong evidence that the expected output price has a positive effect on real cash 
rents.  The county-level results vary significantly across estimators. At the farm-level, the 
estimated price effect for the SEC estimator is nearly double that obtained using the county-level 
data, and is robust across estimators and time periods.    The level of intra-county variability in 
Illinois cash rents, as measured by the standard deviation of rent level reported within a county, 
ranged from approximately $30 to more than $60 per acre.  For comparison, inter-county 
variability, or the standard deviation of county-level rents across the state of Illinois, averaged 
approximately $25 per acre within our panel. This suggests that the use of county-level data, and 
the resulting loss of information through aggregation, can results in significantly different results 
and conclusions with regard to the effect of changes in prices or returns on cash rent levels. 
Cash rents are estimated to increase by approximately $37 per acre given a $1 per bushel 
increase in the expected corn price.  However, even our farm-level estimates are much lower 
than the $79 dollars estimated by Du et al.  The difference may arise from the fact that they 
estimate a production function, and consider the effect of a relative price increase while holding 
input prices constant.  We also control for changes in input prices, but instead by deflating prices 
based on the bundle of inputs used.  Thus, our estimates are deflated by increasing input prices.        11 
 
Estimates from our farm-level SEC estimator indicate an incidence rate of 27% percent 
for government payments. The RE estimator generated a slightly higher, but similar incidence 
rate estimate.  These results are similar to those recently estimated by Kirwan (2009) using farm-
level survey data for the entire U.S. Similar to the case of the estimated effect of corn prices on 
cash rents, the county-level estimates of the relationship between government payments and cash 
rents were much smaller.  
The 2002 Farm Bill introduced a number of changes to commodity programs, including 
the introduction of the direct payment program which provides a fixed level of support each year. 
Thus, we split our panel into two time periods. The first covers the years 1996 through 2001 
while the second covers 2002 through 2008.  Estimates of the effect of changes in price levels on 
cash rent levels do not differ significantly across the two time periods.  However, our results 
indicate that the incidence of government payments on cash rent levels has increased 
significantly over time.   
For the early time period, our incidence rate estimate is just 8 percent.  Following 
introduction of the 2002 Farm Bill, we estimate an incidence rate of nearly 50% percent of 
government payments. We find this result intuitive, based on the shift towards programs which 
offer support on a more consistent basis.  The more certain is the level of government support 
received, the greater the proportion of those payments that may be bid into cash rent levels. 
Each additional bushel of expected yield is estimated to increase cash rents by $1.80 per 
acre. Relative farm-level soil productivity increases (decreases) cash rents by approximately $8 
per acre for every 10% increment above (below) the county SPR mean.  We also find statistical 
evidence of increasing returns to scale. However, the impact of farm size is very small in 
practical terms with cash rents increasing by less than $10 per acre if farm size increase by 1,000 
acres. The estimated effects of production risk and urban pressures lack robustness and statistical 
significance. 
The requirement of the use of a balance panel for our SEC estimator may raise selection 
bias concerns among readers.  To address this issue, we also provide estimates across the entire 
(unbalanced) panel of FBFM farms in the first column of table 3 using a standard RE estimator. 12 
 
The results are strikingly similar to those obtained from the balance panel using the SEC 
estimator. 
The assumption that cash rents are negotiated annually is another potentially weak 
assumption.  In practice, cash rent agreements may be negotiated for multiple crop years and 
thus the true impact of changes in price levels may not be reflected in cash rent values each year. 
As a further robustness check, we also provide results which were based on farms for which 
reported cash rent levels had changed from the previous year. These results are reported in 
columns 2 and 3 of table 3 and, with the exception of the corn price effect, are also strikingly 
similar to the other farm-level specifications.   
When only farms with changing rent levels are analyzed, the effect of the changes in 
prices increases.  This result is intuitive in that changing rent levels imply some level of 
renegotiation, which would be expected to involve the use of current market information and 
expectations. In contrast, rent levels that do not change may be the result of a multi-year rental 
agreement, and would thus not be impacted by year-to-year changes in expected price levels. 
Finally, table 4 reports estimation results for a variety of fixed-effects spatial estimators 
using the balance panel of farms in the FBFM data. Previous work has noted the importance of 
unobserved farm characteristics which may be correlated with observed values, biasing the 
estimation results in these contexts (Kirwan, 2009). While the incorporation of time fixed effects 
results in a smaller estimate of the government payment incidence rate, the inclusion of farm 
fixed effects does not significantly change our results.  Cash rents are still estimated to increase 
by $35 to $40 per acre given a $1 increase in the real corn futures price.  The estimated incidence 
rate for government payments falls in the range of 20 to 30 percent.  
Summary and Conclusions 
This study employs a novel spatial panel econometric approach using farm-level data from 
Illinois to estimate the incidence of price shocks and government payments. We find that while 
rental rates do fluctuate with both price movements and changes in government subsidies, the 
tenant farmer is able to capture much of the revenue generated by changes in futures prices.  
Specifically, we find that for a 1$ increase in the corn futures price, at a 2008 average yield of 
169.88 bushels, tenant farmers capture $131.30 of the extra revenue, while land owners only 13 
 
receive $37.58.  That said, we underestimate the land owners take when we consider only 
county-level average rents, implying that within county variation has a large effect on rental 
outcomes.  That said, our results show a lower estimate compared to those from Du et al (2007) 
who use a variable profit approach. 
Like other papers, we also consider the effect of government payments on cash rents, to 
estimate how they are shared among the various affected parties.   Holding input costs constant. 
we find that on average, an extra dollar of government payments results in a $0.27 per acre 
increase in land rents.  This result is very similar to that found by Kirwan (2009), who found that 
land owners only captured 25% of government payments, with the rest going to producers.  
Interestingly, when we split our data to align it with the 1996 and 2002 farm bills, we find a 
substantial difference in the degree to which payments are capitalized into land costs.  During the 
1996 farm bill, we find that only $0.08 on the dollar is going to landowners, whereas during the 
2002 farm bill, that amount jumps to $0.47.  This increase might result from the fact that the 
2002 farm bill made the fixed payments permanent, and therefore more predictable, and 
entrenched many of the ad hoc disaster payments into permanent programs such as the 
countercyclical payments. 
To test whether we introduced bias by considering only farms that remained in our data 
over the entire 13-year period, we also estimate the same model using an unbalanced panel, and 
find very similar results on the pass-through rates of both price and government payments.  
Second, because we know many producers may not renegotiate their rental rates each year, we 
consider a subset of our data where rental rates change yearly.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, here we 
see a higher pass-through rate of prices, where rental rates increase by $45 for a one dollar 
increase in corn futures.  Interestingly, more frequent adjustments to rental rates do not appear to 
greatly affect the pass-through rate of government subsidies, which remain around $0.20 on the 
dollar. 
In terms of other factors, we find rents differ as expected across relative soil productivity 
ratings, and we find evidence of returns to scale with larger farms paying higher cash rents.  In 
contrast, the estimated effects of urbanization pressures and yield risk are inconsistent across our 
model specifications. We find very limited evidence to support Ricardian theory with a majority 
of increased revenues as a result of high commodity prices being captured by the tenant farmer.   14 
 
Last, our findings suggest that the use of farm level data outperforms that of aggregated 
county level, and that these data are best considered using a model that accounts for spatial 
correlation.  Explicitly taking into account spatial considerations within the empirical model 
gives additional confidence when applying statistical inference to the coefficients as the standard 
BLUE assumptions are fully met. Future research pertaining to cash rents and their land value 
counterparts can benefit from the spatial observations presented in this study and aid researchers 
in deciding whether explicitly accounting for spatial connectedness between neighbors is an 
appropriate assumption and avoiding erroneous inferences from ordinary least squares 
estimation. 
   15 
 
   
Endnotes 
1An observation was deemed an outlier if the observed rent was three times the interquartile 
range for each county-year.  Discussions with FBFM staff indicated that rents in excess of $600 
per acre, were most likely the result of data collection errors. 
2 Non-land costs include fertilizer, seed, pesticide and fuel & oil expenditures. We chose to 
construct a farm-specific producer price index rather than using an aggregate measure such as the 
PPI supplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  A 2008-base index was created for each farmer 
(county) given their individual per acre costs reported for each year.  The index was used to 
deflate all variables given in dollar amounts (cash rent, futures prices, and government 
payments) to equivalent values for the 2008 crop year. 
3 Fixed direct payments and the counter-cyclical program were introduced in 2002. Production 
flexibility contract payments have been largely irrelevant in Illinois since 2002, and were 
completely phased out beginning in 2006. 
4 The construction of the CV variable takes into consideration that the perceived yield risk of a 
farmer will change over time with the accumulation of additional information. As more history is 
observed, the farmer is assumed to update their information set. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Variable Means (Standard Deviations) for the County- and Farm-Level Panels 
Variable  County-Level  Farm-Level 




















SPR  -   
Acres  -  885.16 
(566.83) 




Note: County- and farm- level summary statistics differ due to use of acreage-weighting in the aggregation process. 
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Figure 1. Average Cash Rents in Illinois, 1996 - 2008 





































Table 2. Random Effects (RE) and Spatial Error Component (SEC) Results 
 
County-Level  Farm-level 




Intercept  -303.41***  -270.01***  -372.19***  -358.51***  -296.97***  -627.83*** 
(-12.68)  (-7.98)  (-12.07)  (-9.64)  (-6.47)  (-13.71) 
Price  11.90***  20.93***  37.32***  37.58***  36.76***  34.28*** 
(9.48)  (12.99)  (128.55)  (120.07)  (39.15)  (88.06) 
ExpYield  2.41***  2.11***  1.84***  1.80***  1.69***  2.71*** 
(19.78)  (12.03)  (13.54)  (9.95)  (8.04)  (13.62) 
CV  242.01***  109.70  29.17***  -2.27  -516.75***  1013.4*** 
(4.31)  (1.49)  (0.77)  (-0.05)  (-6.57)  (10.96) 
Beale  1.75*  1.18  0.43  0.25  -0.70  1.36 
(2.09)  (1.39)  (0.50)  (0.22)  (-0.53)  (1.20) 
SPR      81.21***  80.64***  125.98***  62.37*** 
    (4.83)  (4.95)  (5.94)  (3.41) 
Acres      0.008***  0.009***  0.015***  .001*** 
    (3.88)  (4.27)  (4.26)  (4.49) 
GovPay  0.17***  0.12***  0.34***  0.27***  0.08***  0.47*** 
(9.21)  (4.82)  (28.27)  (19.88)  (3.76)  (25.62) 
ρ    0.432    0.278  0.251  0.257 
CF
E  537.73  451.72  1685.38  1578.7  1502.10  1219.29 
C￿
E  238.08  3493.30  920.39  13174  8709.84  7462.69 
G  0.615  0.640  0.647  0.654  0.58  0.60 
C SEaCE    0.3224    0.647  0.636  0.886 
bcdd￿e￿e S￿E 0.433
†  0.6812  0.890
†  0.851  0.204  0.915 
N  1014  1014  5291  5291  2442  2849 
Asterisks (*, **, ***) indicate that the statistic is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
hypothesis level.  T-statistics are given in parenthesis. 
†R-Squared 
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∆Rent ≠ 0  
All Farms
† 
∆Rent ≠ 0  
No Time Gaps
†† 
Intercept  -401.11***  -444.51***  -462.63*** 
(-27.08)  (-21.70)  (-17.94) 
PRICE  35.26***  45.13***  45.22*** 
(116.42)  (142.99)  (120.74) 
ExpYield  1.92***  2.00***  2.06*** 
(33.99)  (25.94)  (21.65) 
CV  10.48  -153.65***  -160.26*** 
(0.36)  (-3.71)  (-3.02) 
Beale  0.71*  0.72  1.61*** 
(2.02)  (1.48)  (2.96) 
SPR  110.46***  132.87***  140.62*** 
(12.88)  (11.12)  (9.20) 
Acres  0.012***  0.012***  0.008*** 
(10.19)  (7.65)  (4.73) 
GovPay  0.29***  0.19***  0.24*** 
(22.70)  (9.72)  (10.56) 
R-Squared  .423  .487  0.477 
N  29,879  24,623  18,300 
Asterisks (*, **, ***) indicate that the statistic is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
hypothesis level.  T-statistics are given in parenthesis. 
 †Includes all farms which were present in the FBFM data for at least two-consecutive years. 
††Includes all farms for which a multi-year time gap did not exist. 
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Price  35.93***  42.33***  41.09***  37.47*** 
(122.61)  (113.93)  (128.14)  (120.23) 
ExpYield    1.78*** 
  (30.14)     
CV  -37.94  60.29**  1.34  -65.67 
(-0.91)  (2.00)  (0.02)  (-1.06) 
Beale    0.16 
  (0.45)     
SPR  18.61  110.00***  20.31  14.55 
(0.63)  (14.08)  (0.77)  (0.52) 
Acres  0.003  0.014***  0.003  0.003 
(1.07)  (12.21)  (1.17)  (1.16) 
GovPay  0.32***  0.04**  0.10***  0.24*** 
(28.01)  (2.69)  (6.93)  (17.77) 
ρ  .076***  .075***  0.06***  0.39*** 
C SEaCE  0.74  .84  .79  0.75 
bcdd￿e￿e S￿E 0.91  0.93  0.91  0.91 
N  5291  5291  5291  5291 
Asterisks (*, **, ***) indicate that the statistic is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
hypothesis level.  T-statistics are given in parenthesis. 21 
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